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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Personal use is the use of copyrighted works for private
purposes, such as learning or entertainment. Reading a
copyrighted book, watching a copyrighted movie or television
program, listening to or singing a copyrighted song, and
employing a copyrighted computer software are all within the
scope of personal use. An issue arises when individual users
want to make a copy of the copyrighted works
.
1
New technologies, such as photocopying machines and
videotape recorders , make the copying of the copyrighted
works become much cheaper and more convenient. Copyright
owners think that individual users' occasional copying for
private use is harmful to their potential market and they
strongly argue for compensation. Does the personal users have
the right to reproduce the copyrighted works for private
reasons? If the answer is positive, what is the scope of this
kind of reproduction?
The confusion about the personal use principle is due to
the controversy about the nature of copyright itself. Since
the nature of copyright determines the nature and scope of
1 See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
users' Rights 193 (1991), hereinafter referred to as Patterson & Lindberg.
2the subordinate principles and rules, the uncertainty of it
results in the confusion about the personal users' rights.
There are two contradictory theories concerning the nature of
copyright: one is the natural-law property right theory, the
basis of the common-law copyright, and the other is the
positive-law theory, the basis of the statutory copyright.
Both natural law and positive law influenced the development
of copyright. 2
Under the concept of natural law, the proprietor of a
certain object owns complete rights over his or her own
property except a few limitations. Because an author creates
the work, the assumption is that the work is the author's
property. It means that an author has complete property
rights on the work because of creation. That is, due to the
law of nature and reason, an author has the common-law
copyright upon the work. 3
However, the other viewpoint argues that copyright is a
right of the positive law which is granted by legislation for
the public welfare. The source of copyright is the statute,
which gives authors certain exclusive rights in the work.
Copyright is thus a statutory-grant right.
2 See id. at 109-110; see also L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair
Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB . 2, 249, at 249 (1992).
3 Justice Aston, in Millar v. Taylor, explained the meaning of the
common law. He said that "The common law, now so called, is founded on
the law of nature and reason. Its grounds, maxims and principles are
derived from many different fountains ,... from natural and moral
philosophy, from the civil and canon law, from logic, from the use,
custom and conversation among men, collected out of the general
disposition, nature and condition of human kind. " (footnote omitted) 4
Burr. 2303, 2343; 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 223 (1769).
3The choice of the nature of copyright should reflect the
purpose of copyright in the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The Copyright Clause contains the purpose and
basic concepts of copyright, which are the most important
guide for copyright legislation. It reads as follows: "The
Congress shall have Power... to Promote the Progress of
Science..., by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings...." 4
The promotion of learning5 is the purpose of copyright.
The exclusive right given to authors for limited times is the
method used to encourage creations and distributions of the
works for the progress of knowledge. The purpose of copyright
as promotion of learning is for protecting the public
interests, rather than benefiting authors.
One aspect of public interests is citizen's rights to use
the copyrighted works, that is, individual users' rights. For
promoting learning, the general public needs sufficient ways
of access to the copyrighted works and enough rights to use
the works. This implies that the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution presupposes individual's right of use of the
copyrighted works. The personal users' rights are protected
directly by the Constitution.
U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl.8.
5 When the Copyright Clause was legislated in the eighteenth century,
"science" meant "knowledge or learning." The purpose of copyright, in
modern terms, is to promote the progress of knowledge and learning. See
Patterson & LlNDBERG, supra note 1, at 48.
4The scope of personal users ' rights is decided by the
nature of copyright. If copyright is a common-law right, it
follows that authors
' rights on the works are complete
property rights, which may be subject to some limitations.
Users, basically, have no rights on the copyrighted works
except those conferred by the statute. If copyright is a
statutory-grant right, authors have the rights given by the
statute only. Any other rights upon the works belong to
society. Users would have more rights to use the copyrighted
works
.
The debate about the nature of copyright began at England
in the eighteenth century, which was for explaining the 1710
Statute of Anne. Such a controversy was because the
stationers (publishers ) lost some rights in the Statute of
Anne. The history of the stationers' copyright before 1710
was a prelude which resulted in the debate of the nature of
copyright. Since these events in England still have influence
on modern statutory copyright, the analysis of the personal
use principle in this paper will start at an review of the
early English copyright history.
The following chapter is an explanation of the purpose of
copyright in the Copyright Clause of the American
Constitution. The nature of American copyright is the next
issue to be analyzed. After clarifying the purpose and nature
of copyright, we will focus on the 1976 Copyright Act. That
the expansion of the copyright owners' exclusive rights
unfortunately endangers the users' right of access to the
5copyrighted works is our next topic. Finally, we will have an
interpretation of the personal users ' rights under current
copyright Act.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT
Copyright in England originated as the stationers'
copyright. 6 This development was a response to the advent of
the printing press which was introduced into England in 1476.
This technology makes books that can be mass reproduced in a
quick and convenient way. For protecting published books from
piracy, the members of the book trade established some form
of property. This kind of property, finally, was to be called
copyright
.
The important point about the stationers ' copyright was
not that the stationers originated it, but that they
controlled its development for a hundred and fifty years and,
furthermore, influenced the subsequent statutory copyright. 7
The reason that the stationers controlled the development of
6 Copyright might originate between 1518 and 1542, when the first book
was printed and published under the privilege of the government. But,
no matter what the precise date copyright originated, it is almost sure
that copyright in England originated as the stationers' copyright. See
LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE [hereinafter PATTERSON,
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE] 42-4 3 (1968).
7 There were two kinds of copyright before the 1710 Statute of Anne:
one was the stationers ' copyright and the other was the printing
patent. Printing patent was a publication right granted by the royal
prerogative. This right declined in the latter part of the seventeenth
century. The stationers' copyright thus became the model of the
statutory copyright. About the details of printing patent, see
generally id. at 78-113.
7copyright for such a long time was partly because of the
government's desire for censorship.
Censorship had been one of the government policies even
before the advent of the printing press. 8 The arrival of the
printing press just transferred the sovereign's attention
from authors to printers and publishers. In the 1530' s, Henry
VIII separated from the Roman Catholic Church, which created
a formidable religious and political unrest. Censorship,
thus, became the sovereign's systematic business. Copyright
at the beginning was an instrument for censorship and a
device for booksellers' private interests.
This chapter will start with the stationers ' copyright and
its relationship to the government press control. The Statute
of Anne, which used the stationers' copyright as the model,
is the following issue. It was the change from the
stationers ' copyright to the statutory copyright that caused
the debate about the nature of copyright. A review of this
controversy in England will give us a more precise
understanding about the nature of copyright.
A. The Stationers' Copyright
The beginning of the stationers' copyright was May 4, 1557,
when the guild of stationers received a royal charter from
Catholic Philip and Mary Tudor to incorporate the Company of
8 See id. at 23.
8Stationers of London. 9 This charter gave the Stationers'
Company the right to search out and destroy illegal printed
materials and granted the printing rights of most of the
books to the stationers. Mary's motive in granting this
charter was to use the stationers as an agency for
suppressing seditious and heretical books. Although the
internal organization of the Brotherhood of Stationers still
functioned in the same way, 10 this charter promoted the
stationers as the government's partner for censorship. The
stationers' copyright, thus, was endorsed by the sovereign.
The stationers
'
copyright was an exclusive right to print
and publish. The purpose of this right was for protecting
published books from piracy on the market. There were two
important aspects of the stationers' copyright: one was that
it was perpetual and the other was that only the members of
the Company were qualified to obtain this copyright. 11
9 The guild of stationers was founded in 14 03 under the grant of the
Mayor and Aldermen of London. See id. at 29.
10 The framework of the Stationers * Company was composed of three main
parts. At the top of the Company was the livery. It included a
principal officer, the master, the upper warden and under warden, the
clerk, and the senior and junior renter wardens. The master, who was
assisted by the upper and under warden, had the right to search out and
destroy illegal printed materials. The primary job of the clerk was to
keep the Company's records. The responsibility of the renter wardens
was to collect membership fees once a quarter.
The members below the livery were freemen, the commonalty or
yeomanry, apprentices who became free, freemen's sons who inherited the
patrimony, persons who transferred from another company, the men who
purchased a copy of the book, the beadle, and the brothers.
At the bottom of the Company were the apprentices. See generally id.
at 28-36.
11 In fact, authors could obtain copyright sometimes. However, in most
cases, the relationship between the stationers and the authors was that
the stationers obtained permission from the authors for publishing the
works and the authors obtained payment from the stationers. If the
authors owned the copyright, the stationer, even though promising to
9The procedure for the stationers to obtain copyright was
to get a license from the official authorities, then present
licensed copy to the Company wardens for permission, then
enter the title of the work and the owner's name of this
title in the register book of the Company. Before 1637, the
entrance was just a custom, not a legal requirement. The Star
Chamber Decree of 1637 firmly established that the entrance
was a requirement for copyright. 12
The Stationers
'
Company was governed by the ordinances
drafted by the Company itself and which were approved by the
government. An important feature which can help us to
understand the nature of the stationers ' copyright was about
the jurisdiction. The Court of Assistants of the Stationers'
Company had the jurisdiction over any members. Any disputes
between members or regarding the book trade should be
submitted to the Court of Assistants before carried to any
other court. This meant that common-law courts took no hand
in the development of the stationers' copyright.
Although even without government censorship regulations,
copyright would still have been created and developed
substantially as it did, the existence of censorship enhanced
the stationers ' monopoly and their right to control the
development of copyright. 13 The stationers' role in press
publish the work, would not like to promote it. See id. at 35-36, 64-
77.
12 About the procedure and form of entrance and whether the entrance
was a requirement for copyright, see generally id. at 51-64.
13 The proclamations of censorship prior to the royal charter of 1557
were the proclamation of 1486-87 by Henry VII, the proclamations of
1U
control was as policemen, rather than as judges or arbiters.
Since the sovereign had no concern on private property right,
the stationers not only had monopoly of printing, but also
had the right to freely create and develop copyright
according to their own interests
.
While the government used copyright as an instrument for
press control, the courts or the legislature played no role
in the development of copyright. This further explains why
authors' right was not developed at that time. To the
government, it meant the difficulty for press control. To the
stationers, it meant the sharing of rights. Both of them
would not like it to be developed.
In 1688, the Glorious Revolution occurred and the
religious unrest ceased. Both the government censorship and
the stationers' monopoly were detested by the public.
Parliament refused to renew the Licensing Act of 1662 in
1694. The stationers lost legal support for their monopolies.
They petitioned the Parliament for recovering all their
benefits. Parliament rejected censorship regulations. The
stationers thus turned to claim authors ' rights in order to
1529, 1530, 1536, 1538, 1544, 1545 and 1546 during Henry VIII's reign,
the proclamation by Edward VI in 1551, and the proclamations of 1533
and 1555 by Queen Mary Tudor.
After 1557, Elizabeth I issued the royal charter of 1558 and the
Star Chamber Decree of 1566 and 1586. Then, Charles I promulgated the
Star Chamber Decree of 1637. In the period of Interregnum, Parliament
enacted the ordinances of 1643, 1647, and 1649. The Licensing Act of
1662 was proclaimed during Charles II 's reign. It was based on the Star
Chamber Decree of 1637 and became the model for the enactment of the
Statute of Anne.
About the history of government censorship and press control, see
generally id. at 20-27 , 114-142.
-mmm—mnairfi in
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save their old monopolies. 14 The result, then, was the 1710
Statute of Anne.
B. The Statute of Anne
The primary purpose of the Statute of Anne was to restore the
order in the book trade after almost sixteen years
'
pandemonium. 15 The title of the Statute of Anne said that it
was "An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the
copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such
copies, during the times therein mentioned." 16 In fact, after
examining the provisions of the Statute of Anne, it showed
that this statute was a trade regulation act to control the
stationers' monopoly, rather than an act for protecting the
authors ' rights
.
Section I of the Statute of Anne broke up the stationers
perpetual copyright by limiting the duration of copyright. It
gave the books which were already printed a twenty-one-year
copyright extension. The books printed after 1710 had a
fourteen-year duration. 17 Section XI further provided that if
14 For details about the early history of copyright, see generally id.
at 1-142. See also Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 19-23.
15 The Statute of Anne, in fact, was not the first English copyright
act. Before it, there were several royal charters, Star Chamber
Decrees, ordinances, and the Licensing Act of 1662. These acts were all
censorship regulations. The Statute of Anne was the first English
copyright statute legislated by the Parliament without any censorship
purpose. See Patterson, historical perspective, supra note 6, at 12.
16 8 Anne, c. 19.
17 Id. §1.
12
the author was still alive after the expiration of the first
14 years, he or she could have copyright protection for
another 14 years. 18 After the expiration of copyright, books
went into the public domain. This is the first time that the
concept of the public domain emerged in the copyright
history.
Another method to destroy booksellers' monopoly was that
everybody had the right to obtain copyright even if he or she
was not the member of the Stationers' Company. According to
§111, if the clerk of the Stationers' Company refused to
register, make entry, or give certificate to the author or
proprietor of the copy or copies , the author or proprietor
could advertise in the Gazette, the legal newspaper' to
secure the copyright. 19
Moreover, §IV required booksellers to maintain the price
of the books at a reasonable rate. 20 Section VII permitted
the importation and sale of books in foreign language printed
beyond the sea. 21
Since the Statute of Anne allowed authors to transfer
their copyright to other persons, the real beneficiaries were
still the booksellers. 22 Under the ordinary situation,
18 id. §xi.
19 id. §iii.
20 id. §iv.
21 id. §vn.
22 According to the title of the Statute of Anne, purchasers of the
copies of printed books could become the copyright owner. 8 Anne, c.
19. This indicated that copyright was transferable. Booksellers still
controlled the book trade.
13
authors must assign their copyright to booksellers in order
to be paid, otherwise, their works would not be printed and
published. Only the renewal right, codified in §XI, was
reserved to the authors. 23 In general, authors were not
entitled to copyright until the enactment of the Statute of
Anne. The copyright in the Statute of Anne was functioned as
a publisher's right.
A comparision of the provisions of the Statute of Anne
with the rules of the stationers ' copyright shows that the
booksellers' rights were severely curtailed. Not only the
duration of copyright was limited rather than perpetual, but
also anybody could become the copyright owner. The
stationers
' petition for recovering their old benefit was
unavoidably
.
After the old copyright expired in 1731, the booksellers'
fear about losing the power on the book trade and about the
possibility of lessened livelihood pushed them to try other
tricks to secure their monopolies. They urged that an author
had a common-law copyright, which resulted in the debate
about the nature of copyright. The meaning of the Statute of
Anne, however, was settled sixty years after its enactment,
23 id. §xi.
14
C. Authors' Common-Law Copyright in England
The main point of the booksellers' argument was that an
author had the common-law copyright because he or she creates
the work. The intention of the booksellers was to use the
author as a chip for getting back their monopolies. If the
authors had a complete property right on the work in
perpetuity, it meant that the booksellers would have this
right by assignment. The purpose of this proposition was to
elude the limitations posed by the Statute of Anne.
In fact, copyright in the Statute of Anne operated as a
publishers' right because it used the stationers' copyright
as the model for its enactment. Before the booksellers argued
for authors' rights, authors, in most of the cases, could not
even be qualified as the copyright owners. Moreover, common-
law courts had no position to help the development of the
stationers' copyright. The so-called authors' common-law
copyright had never existed until the booksellers claimed it.
The whole process about the booksellers' attempt to save
their monopoly was called the "Battle of the Booksellers."
This battle lasted for more than forty years. 24 There were
many petitions and cases during this period of time. Among
them, Millar v. Taylor25 and Donaldson v. Beckett26 were the
24 The "Battle of the Booksellers" started in 1734, when the
booksellers petitioned the Parliament for a new bill to save their
perpetual monopoly. The whole campaign was full of petitions and cases.
Not until 17 74 did the nature of copyright get an answer in Donaldson
v. Beckett. For more details about this situation, see Patterson,
Historical PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 151-79.
25 4 Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
15
most important cases. They decided the nature of English
copyright and influenced the choice of the nature of American
copyright
.
(1). Millar v. Taylor
Andrew Millar was a bookseller who owned the copyright of
"The Seasons." Millar obtained the printing and publishing
permission from the author, James Thomson, in 1729. According
to the Statute of Anne, this copyright had expired in 1757.
Robert Taylor published and sold copies of "The Seasons"
without the license or consent from Millar. In 1767, Millar
sued Taylor for copyright infringement before the Court of
King' s Bench.
The plaintiff alleged that an author had a common-law
copyright after publication and this right had not taken away
by the Statute of Anne. 27 The defendant strongly disagreed. 28
26 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774); 17 Cobbett '
s
Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).
27 The counsel for the plaintiff alleged that "there is a real property
remaining in authors, after publication of their works; and... that this
right is a common law right, which always has existed, and does still
exist, independent of and not taken away by the statute of 8 Ann. c.
19." 4 Burr, at 2304; 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
28 The counsel for the defendant absolutely denied that "any such
property remained in the author, after the publication of his work; and
they treated the pretension of a common law right to it, as mere fancy
and imagination, void of any ground or foundation." They argued that
"formerly the printer, not the author, was the person who was supposed
to have the right,... and accordingly the grants were all made to
printers. No right remains in the author, at common law."
They further insisted that "if an original author publishes his work,
he sells it to the public; and the purchaser of every book or copy has
a right to make what use of it he pleases;....
16
The issues in this case were: "1st. Whether the copy of a
book, or literary composition, belongs to the author, by the
common law; 2d. Whether the common law-right of authors to
the copies of their own works is taken away by 8 Ann. c.
19."29
Four judges delivered their opinions and decided that an
author had a common-law right and this right was not taken
away by the Statute of Anne in a three-to-one verdict.
Justice Willes, Justice Aston and Lord Mansfield ruled for
the plaintiff. The main reason was that the work was created
through the author's labour, so it should be the author's
property. It was just to apply the concepts of property by
occupancy to the author's creation. The author should have
the common-law copyright. 30 This right could not be found in
custom, but, according to the natural principles, moral
justice and fitness, it was just for an author to reap the
profits and to protect the integrity and paternity of the
work. 31 This copy-right had not taken away by the Statute of
Anne. 32
The Act of Parliament of 8 Ann. c. 19, for the encouragement of
learning, vests the copies of printed books in the authors or
purchasers of such copies, during the times therein limited. But it is
only during that limited time; and under the terms prescribed by the
Act. And the utmost extent of the limited time is, in the present case,
expired. ..."
4 Burr, at 2304; 98 Eng. Rep. at 202.
29 4 Burr, at 2311; 98 Eng. Rep. at 206
30 This opinion was based on Justice Aston' s speech. He alleged that "a
man may have property in his body, life, fame, labours, and the like;
and, in short, in any thing that can be called his." 4 Burr, at 2335-
54; 98 Eng. Rep. at 218-29.
31 Lord Mansfield thought that the source of the common law right was
drawn from the argument that "it is just, that an author should reap
17
A dissenting opinion was rendered by Justice Yates. He
asserted that an author had no common-law copyright because
the concepts of property by occupancy could not apply to the
style and ideas. 33 This common-law right of the author did
not exist in custom. 34 The statutory copyright granted by the
the pecuniary profits of his own ingenuity and labour. It is just, that
another should not use his name, without his consent. It is fit that he
should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will publish. It is
fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication;
how many; what volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose
care he will trust the accuracy and correctness of the impression; in
whose honesty he will confide, not to foist in additions: with other
reasonings of the same effect." He thought that this author's common-
law right before publication should be applied to author even after he
or she published the work. The language of the Statute of Anne had no
implications to expel the common-law copyright. 4 Burr, at 2395-2403;
98 Eng. Rep. at 250-55.
32 Justice Willes
' opinion for the plaintiff was that he used the
stationers' copyright as the model of the common-law copyright. His
supporting evidences were the decrees of the Star-Chamber, Acts of
State, and several precedents which were decided based on these
previous censorship regulations. 4 Burr, at 2310-2335; 98 Eng. Rep. at
205-218. Justice Yates, in his dissenting opinion, thought that the
stationers ' copyright was irrelevant to the authors ' common-law
copyright because "the by-laws of the Stationers' Company protect none
but their own members." 4 Burr, at 2377; 98 Eng. Rep. at 241. and
because "no author whatever had from them(the by-laws), the least
pretension to copy-right." 4 Burr, at 2371; 98 Eng. Rep. at 238.
33 Justice Yates said that property "is a right by which the very
substance of a thing belongs to one person, so that it cannot. . .become
another ' s. .. .Sentiments are free and open to all; and many people may
have the same ideas upon the same subject. In that case, every one of
these persons to whom they independently occur, is equally possessed
and equally master of all these ideas; and has an equal right to them
as his own." 4 Burr, at 2358; 98 Eng. Rep. at 231.
34 4 Burr, at 2367-69; 98 Eng. Rep. at 236-37. Justice Yates thought
that "to constitute a legal custom, it must have these two qualities:
first, a custom must import some general right in a district, and not a
few mere private acts of individuals; and, in the next place, such
custom must appear to have existed immemorially . " But, "the art of
printing was not known in this kingdom, till the reign of Ed. 4.
therefore these contracts could not be derived from the ancient
immemorial law of the land: and, consequently, they could not create a
species of property which was unknown to that law." So the common law
copyright did not exist in custom.
18
Statute of Anne was the only right the author had after
publication. 35
The conclusion of Millar v. Taylor was that an author had
the common-law right after, as well as before, publication.
The booksellers still had the monopoly in perpetuity. The
purpose of the Statute of Anne for against monopoly was
negated under this decision.
(2). Donaldson v. Beckett
Millar v. Taylor was not appealed. The decision gave Andrew
Millar the perpetual property interests on his copy "The
Seasons," but he died in 1768. The executors of Millar's
estate auctioned all his copies off in 1769. The syndicate of
Thomas Beckett and other fourteen partners obtained the
copyright of "The Seasons."
Alexander and John Donaldson thought that the copyright of
"The Seasons" was expired under the provisions of the Statute
of Anne, so they printed and sold thousands of copies of "The
Seasons." In 17 72, Beckett and his partners, in accordance
with the decision of the Millar case, acquired a perpetual
injunction from the Court of Chancery to restrain Donaldsons.
Donaldsons appealed to the House of Lords
.
The issue in Donaldson v. Beckett was whether the author
had the common-law right of sole printing and publishing the
work in perpetuity. The House of Lords directed five
35 4 Burr, at 2354-96; 98 Eng. Rep. at 229-50.
19
questions to the judges of the common-law courts, the Court
of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer for their
advisory opinions. These questions were:
1. Whether at common law, an author of any book or
literary composition had the sole right of first
printing and publishing the same for sale; and
might bring an action against any person who
printed published and sold the same without his
consent?
2. If the author had such right originally, did the
law take it away, upon his printing and
publishing such book or literary composition; and
might any person afterward reprint and sell, for
his own benefit, such book or literary
composition, against the will of the author?
3. If such action would have lain at common law, is
it taken away by the Statute of 8th Ann.? And is
an author, by the said statute precluded from
every remedy except on the foundation of the said
statute and on the terms and conditions
prescribed thereby?
4. Whether the author of any literary composition
and his assigns, had the sole right of printing
and publishing the same in perpetuity, by the
common law?
20
5. Whether this right is any way impeached
restrained or taken away by the statute 8th
Ann.? 36
The answers of these five questions were: (1) Yes. (2) No.
(3) Yes. (4) Yes. (5) Yes. 37 The first three questions dealt
with only the author's right and the last two with the right
of the author and his assigns. The fourth question was added
for reconsidering the Millar case. After hearing the judges'
opinions, the lords debated and reversed the grant of the
perpetual injunction. 38
The main reasons to object the common-law copyright were
that the author's common-law right had never existed in
previous copyright history until the booksellers claimed it39
and ideas should be free of use once the author released them
36 4 Burr, at 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. at 257-58,
37 Eleven judges delivered their opinions. Six of them stood against
the authors' common-law right, and the other five supported the
existence of this right. About the content of the judges' opinions, see
17 Cobbett's Pari. Hist, at 971-92.
38 The lords, by a vote of 22 to 11, reversed the decree of the Court
of Chancery for granting the perpetual injunction. See 17 Cobbett's
Pari. Hist, at 1003.
39 The statements of Lord Chief Justice De Grey and Lord Camden were
good examples of this argument. Lord Chief Justice De Grey said that
"The truth is, the idea of a common-law right in perpetuity was not
taken up till after that failure in procuring a new statute for an
enlargement of the term." 17 Cobbett's Pari. Hist, at 992. Lord Camden
supported this opinion and spoke that "The arguments attempted to be
maintained on the side of the Respondents, were founded on patents,
privileges, Star-chamber decrees, and the bye laws of the Stationers'
Company ;.. .the very last places in which I should have dreamt of
finding the least trace of the common law of this kingdom..." Ibid.
21
to the public. 40 On the other hand, the supporters of the
common-law copyright thought that ideas were the author's
property even after publication, so the author should have a
perpetual common-law copyright. 41
The conclusion of Donaldson v. Beckett was that an
author's common-law right was taken away and supplanted by
the Statute of Anne after publication. The common-law
copyright meant the exclusive right of first publication
only. In fact, even without this decision, the author
presumably had the first publication right. Once an author
published his or her work, he or she had only the rights
granted by the Statute of Anne. But the rights granted by the
Statute of Anne were merely the interests derived from
publication. An author still has the right to protect the
attribution and integrity of his or her work because of
40 This point could be explained by the following argument of Lord
Camden that "If there be any thing in the world common to all mankind,
science and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought
to be as free and general as air or water." 17 Cobbett ' s Pari. Hist, at
999, and that "Knowledge has no value or use for the solitary owner: to
be enjoyed it must be communicated. .. .Glory is the reward of science,
and those who deserve it,..." Id. at 1000.
41 Judge Ashurst was one of the proponents for the author's common-law
copyright and contended that ideas should be claimed as the author's
property. He urged that "Literary property was to be defined and
described as well as other matters, and matters which were tangible.
Every thing was property that was capable of being known or defined,
capable of a separate enjoyment, and of value to the owner. Literary
property fell within the terms of this definition. According to the
appellants, if a man lends his manuscript to his friend, and his friend
prints it, or if he loses it, and the finder prints it, yet an action
would lie..., which shewed that there was a property beyond the
materials, the paper and print. That a man, by publishing his book,
gave the public nothing more than the use of it. A man may give the
public a highway through his field, and if there was a mine under that
highway, it was nevertheless his property." 17 Cobbett ' s Pari. Hist, at
976-77.
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creation even after publication. This error was because the
assumption that the Statute of Anne contained an author's
complete interests of the work. For rejecting the author's
common-law copyright, it was only need to reject the
perpetual common-law copyright, but not necessarily meant
that an author lost all the rights upon the work after
publication
.
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However, the holding of Donaldson v. Beckett was the only
way which could destroy the booksellers' monopoly. After this
decision, copyright was an author's right rather than a
publisher's right. It was this author's right received into
the United States several years later.
42 About the opinions and comments of Donaldson v. Beckett, see
generally Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 36-46. See also Patterson,
Historical Perspective, supra note 6, at 172-79.
CHAPTER 3
THE PURPOSE AND POLICIES OF COPYRIGHT
The purpose and policies of copyright are articulated in the
U.S. Constitution. There are two Clauses in the Constitution
which are related to copyright. One is the Intellectual-
Property Clause and the other is the First Amendment.
The Intellectual-Property Clause contains the Patent
Clause and the Copyright Clause. It articulates the purpose
and policies for both patent and copyright. The content of it
is "The Congress shall have Power... to Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 43 According to this language, the
purpose of copyright is to promote learning by empowering
Congress to give authors the exclusive right to their works.
The First Amendment is for protecting public ' s rights of
free speech and press. It provides that "Congress shall make
no law. .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press...." 44 The two rights in the First Amendment the
43 U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl.8.
44 The First Amendment reads as follows: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST, amend. I.
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right of free speech and the right of free press are known
together as "free speech rights."
The free speech rights are the public's rights to
disseminate and have access to information. However, the
Copyright Clause gives Congress a power to grant authors the
exclusive right which is a restraint on users' right of
access. In appearance, they conflict with each other, but, in
fact, they could complement one another.
In this chapter, we will first explain the purpose,
policies and the functional scheme of the Copyright Clause.
The free speech in the First Amendment and its relationship
to the Copyright Clause are the following issues that we will
discuss in the second part of this chapter.
A. The Purpose and Policies of Copyright in the Copyright
Clause
The Copyright Clause was enacted by using the title of the
Statute of Anne as its model. 45 The main purpose stated in
these two documents is the same: to promote the progress of
learning. An important difference between them was that the
Statute of Anne protected publishers as well as authors, but
the Copyright Clause protects authors only.
45 Not only the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution imitated the
English Statute of Anne, but the various American state statutes and
the federal Copyright Act of 1790 also used this statute as a model to
legislate their own acts. The English copyright is the lineal ancestor
of the American copyright. See Patterson, historical perspective, supra
note 6, at 3.
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There are four policies in the Copyright Clause: the
promotion of learning; the preservation of the public domain;
the protection of the authors' exclusive rights of
publication; and the general public's right of access. 46 A
precise understanding of these policies can help to decide
the nature of copyright as well as the subordinate principles
and rules.
( 1 ) . Promotion of the Progress of Learning
The purpose of copyright is to promote the progress of
science. Copyright exists for the reason of making the
advancement of the welfare of entire society. For achieving
this purpose, Congress is empowered to secure to authors the
exclusive right for a limited period of time.
The functional scheme the Copyright Clause designed to
attain the purpose of promoting knowledge is to use the
exclusive right as an inducement to encourage authors'
creations and distribution of the works. In theory, more
creations and distribution of the works can enrich the
culture and make the progress of knowledge. This should be
under the premise that the works have the chance to be used
by the society. Copyright is construed around the concept of
the use of the work. 47
46 See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 47-49, 52.
47 Id. at 191-92.
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Since the protection of the authors' exclusive right is
just a method to promote learning, it is necessary to
establish limitations on the exclusive right for preventing
authors' overcontrol on the published works. The limitations
are established not only on the scope, but also on the
protection time. The extent of the exclusive right given to
authors should reach the line that it can protect the works
on the market and would not be an obstacle to the progress of
science.
Copyright is a deal between the authors and society.
Society confers the authors the monopoly to reap the benefit
from their own creations . The quid pro quo that authors
should offer the society is to allow the general public to
use the works . Then the works can make certain contributions
to society. The effect of the exclusive right given to
authors is to protect the works from piracy, not to prevent
the general public's use of the work. Giving the right to
users to use the work for personal reasons is a necessary
method for promoting learning. This is the personal use
principle. The Constitution is just the source that the
personal users' rights come from. 48
( 2 ) . Preservation of the Public Domain
Public domain means that ideas, words and knowledge belong to
every members of our society. Everyone has the right to use
48 ibid.
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and employ ideas or words without any charge or limitations.
These ideas or words can not be owned by certain specific
persons. 49
To protect the public domain, there are three concepts.
First, a work should possess a certain degree of originality
for obtaining copyright. 50 Copyright is given because of the
author's creative combination and organization of the words
and ideas. The copyright protection reaches only to the parts
which are newly created. The author has no right to claim
copyright on the materials already in the public domain.
Originality is a required condition for a work to get
copyright protection. 51
Second, once the work is published, the scope of the
exclusive right given to authors should be limited. The
author should not have the absolutely control right on the
work which inevitably constitutes ideas and words from the
public domain.
Third, the protection time should be limited. Authors
obtain the ideas and knowledge from society to form a new
49 See id. at 50-51.
50 The definition of the originality, as developed by the courts,
contains two aspects: "independent creation by the author, and a modest
quantum of creativity." See Craig Joyce et al., Copyright law 55-56 (2d
ed. 1991).
51 Later in the 1976 Copyright Act, originality is codified as a
required condition for copyright. Section 102 of the 1976 Act says that
copyright protection subsists in "original works of authorship" and
does not extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. §102 (1994).
Furthermore, §103 states that "the copyright in a compilation or
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author
of such work... and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material...." id. §103.
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work. By inference, it is not reasonable for them to have the
exclusive right in perpetuity. After they enjoy the monopoly
for a period of time, they should release the works back to
society. The result of this kind of process is that all the
works will go into the public domain and the culture and
knowledge of our society will be promoted. 52
(3). Protection of the Exclusive Right of Publication
Congress grants authors an exclusive right to their writings.
Since the Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution used the
title of the Statute of Anne as a model, we can find the
meaning of this exclusive right by tracing back to the
English history.
Throughout the period of the stationers' copyright, the
right which the stationers had on their copies was the
exclusive right to print and publish. 53 The Statute of Anne
inherited this meaning. It vested the copyright only on
"printed books." 54
In 1769, Millar v. Taylor, 55 which was viewed as an
explanation of the Statute of Anne, clarified the content of
52 Prof. Chafee raised this theory in 1945. He said that "a dwarf
standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself." The dwarf refers to the author and the giant society. Through
this process, knowledge will be promoted. Zecharich Chafee, Reflections
on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. rev. 503, at 511 (1945).
53 See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
54 8 Anne, c. 19.
55 4 Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769).
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copy-right. It stated that "the copy of a book legally used
as a technical expression of the author's sole right of
printing and publishing that work " 56 and "...the word
'copy '...has been used for ages, to signify an incorporeal
right to the sole printing and publishing of somewhat
intellectual, communicated by letters." 57 It is clear that
the "exclusive right" meant a sole right of printing and
publishing at that time. 58
Even though Donaldson v. Beckett59 overruled Millar v.
Taylor five years later, the meaning of the exclusive right
had not been changed. Donaldson v. Beckett rejected an
author's common-law copyright after publication. The author
only could have the right granted by the Statute of Anne once
the work was published. The exclusive right given by the
Statute of Anne was the right to print and publish.
When the Copyright Clause was codified in 1787, there was
no other meaning could be found for the author's exclusive
right. The content of the "exclusive right" in the U.S.
Constitution, at that time, was an exclusive right to "print,
publish and vend" the work. 60 The exclusive right in the
56 4 Burr, at 2346; 98 Eng. Rep. at 225.
57 4 Burr, at 2396; 98 Eng. Rep. at 251.
58 Even though the judges in Millar v. Taylor, in fact, treated the
copyright as the author's whole property interest of the work, they
expressly admitted the meaning of copyright as the sole right of
printing and publishing only.
59 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774); 17 Cobbett '
s
Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).
60 The copyright principle developed after 1787 supported this point of
view. Under the provisions of the 1790 Act, the copyright owner had the
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Copyright Clause is limited on its scope. Authors can only
have the exclusive right which the copyright statute gives to
them. The other rights belong to the public. The policy in
the Constitution is to give a limited-scope exclusive right
to authors for the promotion of learning.
(4). The Implied Right of Access
For promoting learning, the general public needs effective
and sufficient ways to have the chance to use the works. This
is the users' right of access. The Copyright Clause does not
explicitly stipulate this right, however, the right of access
is necessary for promoting learning. If users can not or have
difficulties to use the copyrighted works, how can the
knowledge be promoted? The framers of the Constitution had
already considered the public's right of access when they
legislated the Copyright Clause.
The most powerful method to safeguard the right of access
is to make publication a prerequisite for obtaining copyright
protection. If every work needs to be published, the right of
access to the copyrighted works is guarateed. Otherwise, the
right of access would be endangered. 61
rights to print, reprint, publish and vend the work. 1 Stat. 124 §2
(1845). A digest, abridgment, or translation of the copyrighted work
was not an infringement of copyright because the result of these
conducts was a new work and it did not print, reprint, publish or vend
the original copyrighted work. See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at
60. This inferred that the exclusive right is an exclusive right to
print, publish and vend the work. The meaning of the exclusive right
was almost the same as that in the Copyright Clause.
61 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 52-55.
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The group which controls the publication of the works is
the publishers rather than the authors. But in the Copyright
Clause, the Congress only has the power to secure copyright
to authors. The publishers are excluded from copyright
protection.
The main reason for the framers of the Constitution to
exclude publishers is the concern about preventing
booksellers' monopoly. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
England, it was the booksellers who not only controlled the
access to, but also monopolized the price of, the books. An
author, ordinarily, must spend a lot of time for just
reproducing one work. A publisher, on the other hand, can
control the distribution of many works from different authors
at the same time. This is why the Copyright Clause excludes
the publishers from copyright protection. 62
However, the functional system of the book trade is that
the author assigns copyright to the publisher for
publication. 63 Without the publishers, there is no
62 See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand.
L. REV. 1, at 13-19 (1987).
63 Because the authors must assign their copyright to the publishers
for publication of the works, an unfortunate influence is the under
development of the authors' moral rights. The implication of the
Copyright Clause seems to be that the exclusive right constitutes the
authors' whole right of the work once the work is published. However,
after the authors assign copyright to the publishers, they should still
have the right to protect the attribution and integrity of the works
.
If the subject protected in the Copyright Clause includes the
publishers as well as the authors, it may be easier to distinguish the
difference between the rights derived from creation (the authors'
rights) and the rights derived from publication (the publishers'
rights). Authors' moral rights might be developed earlier and better.
About the development of the authors' moral rights, see generally
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 163-76.
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publication. The users get no access to the works. A better
legislation is to regulate the publishers' rights rather than
exclude or ignore it. 64
The 1790 Copyright Act, the first federal copyright
statute, secured copyright for both the authors and the
publishers. 65 All the subsequent Copyright Acts provided
copyright protection for the publishers, including the 1976
Act. The best way to promote learning should accommodate the
three conflict rights the authors' rights, the publishers'
rights, and the users' rights in a balanced level.
In conclusion, the purpose of American copyright is to
promote the progress of learning by providing authors
exclusive right within a limited period of time under the
premise that it will not encroach on the public interests.
The public interests are explicitly protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution as free speech rights.
64 To establish the rules about the publishers' rights, the most
important thing is to clarify the nature of copyright as a statutory-
grant right. See infra text accompanying notes 83-107. If the copyright
owners' exclusive rights are limited, the possibility of the
publishers' overcontrol on the book trade is comparatively low. The
other way is to use the First Amendment as an aid to restraint of the
Congressional power on granting rights to publishers. See infra text
accompanying notes 66-82.
65 The title of the 17 90 Copyright Act stated that it was "An act for
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts,
and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the
times therein mentioned." 1 Stat. 124 (1845).
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B. The Free Speech Rights in the First Amendment
Due to the English history of censorship and press control,
the purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent any
unreasonable control on the flow of information.
Although the First Amendment was adopted in 17 90, the
development of the free speech concepts were relatively late.
Not until recent decades did the Supreme Court develop the
free speech rights as the right to hear, speak, read, and
print. It is a public's right of access to and dissemination
of ideas. 66
(1). The Relationship between Copyright and the Free Speech
Rights
Copyright and the free speech rights are related because both
of them deal with the same subject matter information. The
purpose of the First Amendment is to promote the flow of
information by forbidding Congress on making laws to abridge
the freedom of speech and of the press. The Copyright Clause,
however, gives Congress the power to grant the exclusive
proprietary right to authors. The use of the exclusive right
may constitute infringement. It seems that the exclusive
right is a restraint on the free speech rights.
66 That the free speech rights include the right of access is a modern
concept which was established by the following cases: Board of
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) and Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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In fact, copyright and the free speech rights complement
to each other. The free speech rights protect people's
freedom of speech and print. The creations and distribution
of the works would not be censored. The purpose of copyright
for the progress of learning would be promoted. The free
speech rights can protect the freedom of copyright.
On the other hand, the granting of copyright to authors is
a method to improve the free speech rights . The purpose of
giving authors the exclusive right in a limited time is for
encouraging their creations and distribution. If there are
more works created and distributed, the public would have
more opportunities to read and hear. Besides this, at the
time the Copyright Clause was codified, the "exclusive right"
meant the exclusive printing, publishing and vending right
only. 67 Authors do not have the absolute exclusive right to
control the works. Although giving copyright to authors
sacrifices part of the public interests temporarily, it
promotes the flow of information in the long run. Copyright
does not abridge the free speech rights, but improves them.
Moreover, the Copyright Clause is a promotion of learning
clause. Promotion of learning requires a right of access to
the works. The Copyright Clause has free speech values. This
point of view can also be verified by the history. The
Copyright Clause was enacted from the title of the Statute of
Anne. There were four provisions in the Statute of Anne which
protected the right of access. Section I limited the terms of
67 See supra text accompanying notes 53-60
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copyright and created the public domain. 68 Section IV was a
price-control provision. 69 Section V required that nine
copies of each books should be delivered to the Stationers'
Company for the use of the libraries of nine universities. 70
Section VII removed the restrictions on the importation,
vending, or selling of books in foreign language printed
beyond the seas. 71 The Statute of Anne had free speech
values. The Copyright Clause has this free speech values and
does not conflict with the First Amendment. 72
When Congress legislates the copyright acts according to
the language of the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment is
an aid to prevent Congress from enacting laws which violate
the public interests. Congress did it well in the nineteenth
century. However, the application of copyright to new
technology of communication corrupts the existed balance
between copyright and the free speech rights in the twentieth
century.
68 8 Anne, c. 19, SI.
69 id. siv.
70 id. SV.
71 id. svn.
72 About the relationship between copyright and the free speech rights
,
see Patterson & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 123-28.
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(2). The Development of the Free Speech Rights
Before examining the achievement of the free speech rights,
it is necessary to clarify the priority between copyright and
the free speech rights. Copyright is an exception to the free
speech rights . The free speech rights are people ' s political
rights which protect the public interests. Theoretically,
public interests are more important than individual's
proprietary interests. Furthermore, the proprietary right is
one of the people's political rights which need to be
recognized and enforced by the government. The priority of
the free speech rights is superior to authors' copyright. The
authors ' proprietary right should be protected under the
premise that they will not endanger the public interests. 73
In the nineteenth century, both legislative and judicial
development implemented the right of public access. Congress
legislated that publication was a requirement for obtaining
copyright. 74 The courts developed three fundamental
principles to protect public's right of access. In Wheaton v.
Peters, 15 the Supreme Court decided that an author can only
have the rights granted by the statute after publication.
73 See id. at 131
74 In the first copyright act of 1790, section 3 required that the
author or proprietor "shall, within two months from the date (of
deposit a printed copy of the title of the work) thereof, cause a copy
of the. . .record (of the work) to be published in one or more of the
newspapers printed in the United States, for the space of four weeks."
1 Stat. 124 §3 (1845). This publication requirement is eliminated by
the 1976 Copyright Act.
75 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834)
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This statutory-monopoly principle rejected the author's
absolute rights on the work and ensured the right of
access. 76 The Supreme Court later in Baker v. Selden11
established the limited-protection principle which
distinguished ideas from expression and protected the users
'
right of using ideas. 78 The fair use principle was founded by
Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh. 19 This case made a
distinction between a use of the work and a use of the
copyright, thus prevented from binding individual's personal
use upon the fair use restriction. 80 These principles protect
the free speech rights even though they are developed as
copyright law. 81
The free speech became an issue in the twentieth century.
There are three development in the twentieth century which
endangers the right of access. One is the expansion of the
copyright owners' exclusive rights to encompass the right to
copy. Another is the elimination of the publication
requirement. The codification of the fair use doctrine
further endangers the users ' right of access
.
76 See generally Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 61-64.
77 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
78 See generally Patterson & lindberg, supra note 1, at 60-61.
79 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901)(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
80 See generally Patterson & lindberg, supra note 1, at 66-68.
81 About the American experience of free speech rights, see Patterson,
Free Speech and Copyright, supra note 62, at 33-36.
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The most important method to save the foundering free
speech rights is to have a unified theory about the nature of
copyright. For promoting the flow of information, copyright
should be regulatory in nature and construed as a statutory-
grant right. An effective distinction between the use of the
work and the use of copyright is the basis for protecting the
users' right of access. 82 The argument about the nature of
copyright is the most controversial issue in the copyright
history.
82 See Patterson & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 132-33.
CHAPTER 4
THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly endorse or reject the author's common-law right. 83
The 1790 Copyright Act, provided no conclusive answer about
this issue, either. The nature of copyright remained as
undecided at the beginning of American copyright legislation.
The issue of the common-law copyright did not come into
focus until 1834 when Wheaton v. Peters was brought to the
Supreme Court. 84 Wheaton v. Peters was viewed as the American
counterpart of Donaldson v. Beckett. Its holding exempted the
application of the common-law copyright from the federal
copyright system. Since the common-law copyright was still
effective in the state law after the Wheaton case, the debate
about the nature of copyright had not ceased.
The most unfortunate result of this controversy is the
inability to distinguish the use of the work and the use of
copyright. The use of the material object in which the work
is embodied is a use of the work; the exercise of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owners is a use of
83 About this issue, see Howard B. Abrams , The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29
WAYNE L. REV. 1119, at 1174-78 (1983).
84 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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copyright. 85 This distinction is the basis for deciding the
scope of personal use. The failure to distinguish between the
use of the work and the use of copyright impedes the
distinction between the personal use by a consumer and the
fair use by a competitor. 86
The nature of copyright in the 1976 Copyright Act is a
statutory-grant right. This statute, basically, reflects the
purpose of copyright as the promotion of learning. Since the
copyright owners still act as copyright is their own private
property right, a detailed explanation about the nature of
copyright is thus necessary and important.
A. Wheaton v. Peters
Richard Peters, after succeeded Henry Wheaton as the reporter
for the U.S. Supreme Court, announced a circular about
publishing the whole series of the decisions argued and
adjudged in the Supreme Court from its organization to
January term, 1827, which might include the cases already
published by Wheaton. Wheaton and his publisher, Robert
Donaldson, sent a plea to prevent Peters' plan, but Peters
ignored it and published his Condensed Reports. The third
volume of the Condensed Reports contained some cases reported
earlier in Wheaton ' s Reports. Wheaton and Donaldson filed a
85 See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 120-22.
86 Id. at 197-200.
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bill in the Circuit Court in Pennsylvania for seeking an
injunction against Peters and his publisher, John Grigg. 87
Wheaton and Donaldson claimed a copyright in the Wheaton's
Reports both under the copyright statute and the common law.
Peters denied that his Condensed Reports was a violation of
the complainants' rights. He averred that: first, Wheaton and
Donaldson had not performed the requisites of the Copyright
Act; second, there was no common-law copyright in the United
States; and third, Whea ton's Reports was not a work entitled
to copyright, either by the statute or by the common law.
Judge Hopkinson of the circuit court first considered the
complainants' right under the statute. The evidence provided
by the plaintiff was insufficient to prove a valid compliance
of the fourth section of the 1790 Copyright Act which
required a delivery of a copy of the work to the secretary of
state within six months after publication. 88 The question was
whether this compliance was indispensable for an author to
obtain statutory copyright. According to the decision of Ewer
87 See Patterson, HISTORICAL Perspective, supra note 6, at 203-04.
88 There were four conditions to be complied with for obtaining
copyright protection. Section 3 of the 1790 Act required an author to
deposit the title of the book in the clerk's office. 1 Stat. 124-26 §3
(1845). Then, according to §1 of the 1802 Act, it was necessary to
insert the copy of the record made by the clerk in the page of the book
next to the title. 2 Stat. 171 §1. Section 3 of the 1790 Act further
required a public notice in the newspapers within two months after
deposit for the space of four weeks. Section 4 of the 1790 Act
requested an author to deliver a copy of the work to the secretary of
state within six months after publication. 1 Stat. 124-26 §4. The
testimony for Wheaton alleged that eighty copies of Wheaton 's Reports
were delivered to the department of state. The court thought that this
delivery under the reporter's act did not exonerate Wheaton from
depositing a copy of his work required by the 1790 Copyright Act.
Wheaton failed to comply with §4 of the 1790 Act. Wheaton v. Peters, 29
Fed. Cas. 862, at 863-65 (No. 17,486) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832).
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v. Coxe, ss the circuit court ruled that the statutory
provisions was essential, rather than merely directory, to be
complied with for an author to obtain his or her title.
About the claim of author's common-law copyright, the
court, based on the reasoning of U.S. v. Worrall, 90 ruled
that there was no common law existed in the U.S. federal
government. In the case of state common-law right, the court
said that, even though the states followed the English
common-law system, there were no states adopted the whole of
the common law from England and every states adopted
different provisions because of different regional needs.
Even in England, the issue about the existence of the common-
law copyright had not been settled. Judge Hopkinson concluded
that no common-law copyright was set up "in the colonies, in
the states, or in the United States,..." 91 He dissolved the
injunction and dismissed the bill. 92
Wheaton appealed to the Supreme Court. 93 The only point
unanimously agreed to by the judges of the Supreme Court was
that the court's opinions can not become the subject matter
of copyright. However, the notes, syllabus, summaries and
index about the cases still could be copyrighted. 94 The two
89 8 Fed. Cas. 917 (No. 4,584) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824).
90 28 Fed. Cas. 774 (No. 16,766) (C.C.D. Pa 1798).
91 Wheaton v. Peters, 29 Fed. Cas. 862, 872.
92 Wheaton v. Peters, 29 Fed. Cas. 862 (No. 17,486) (C.C.E.D. Pa,
1832).
93 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
94 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 698g (Brightly 's 3rd ed. )
.
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main issues in this case were: first, does an author have a
right at common law after publication? and second, do the
conditions required by the statute have to be strictly
complied with for securing copyright?
The opinion of the majority, written by Justice McLean,
was based on the theory that copyright is a monopoly. The
author has no right to hold a perpetual property in the
ideas, instruction or entertainment afforded by the book. 95
Under this premise, the majority held that there is no
common-law copyright of the U.S. federal system unless the
federal legislation explicitly adopt it. Since the federal
government is composed of many states which have different
local usage, customs and common law, any federal principles
have to be clearly embodied. The plaintiff's assertion of
common-law right should be determined under the law of
Pennsylvania. After discussing Millar v. Taylor96 and
95 The following paragraph can express this basic assumption of the
majority: "That an author, at common law, has a property in his
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of
it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by
its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very deferent right
from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the
future publication of the work, after the author shall have published
it to the world.
The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product
of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be controverted.
And the answer is, that he realises this product by the transfer of his
manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first published.
A book is valuable on account of the matter it contains, the ideas
it communicates, the instruction or entertainment it affords. Does the
author hold a perpetual property in these? Is there an implied contract
by every purchaser of his book, that he may realise whatever
instruction or entertainment which the reading of it shall give, but
shall not write out or print its contents." See 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,
at 657.
96 4 Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769)
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Donaldson v. Beckett, 91 the majority thought that the
existence of author's common-law right in England was still
in doubt. Even if the author's common-law right were shown to
exist in England, no one can contend that Pennsylvania
adopted all the provisions of English common law. Moreover,
long before the issue of author's common-law right was
emerged, the colony of Pennsylvania was settled. The common-
law copyright had not been recognized in Pennsylvania.
The basic premise of the dissenters was that an author, as
a creator, had a natural-law property right on the work. The
dissenting opinions, by Justice Thompson and Justice Baldwin,
relied on the decision of Millar v. Taylor and thought that
an author had a common-law copyright. Donaldson v. Beckett,
based on the Burrow's Reports, did not overrule Millar v.
Taylor, but affirmed it. The copyright statute was enacted to
protect an existing right, but not to create it.
About the second question, the majority held that strict
compliance of the statutory requirements was essential to a
perfect title. It was not appropriate for the court to
determine the requirements were important or not, but the
legislature. However, the court was not satisfied with the
circuit court's finding about whether Wheaton deposited a
copy of his book in the state secretary's office, so it
remanded to a jury of the circuit court to decide this fact.
The case was reversed.
97 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774); 17 Cobbett '
s
Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).
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The requirements of the statute, according to the
dissenters, were partly mandatory and partly directory.
Requiring a strict compliance was not equitable to Wheaton
who enjoyed copyright peacefully for a long time. Even if
Wheaton did not completely comply with the statutory
conditions, his copyright had not expired. The Congress did
not intend to make these requirements indispensable.
Wheaton v. Peters settled the concept of copyright as a
statutory-grant monopoly. This result is necessary for
promoting the purpose of copyright. Regulating the rights
between authors, entrepreneurs and users through legislation
is the best way to ensure the promotion of learning. 98 The
copyright owners ' absolute control on the work will become an
obstacle of the progress of learning. Copyright should be a
statutory-grant right.
The defect of the Wheaton case was that the majority
opinion did not speak with determination on the point that
the common-law copyright did not exist in England because
Donaldson v. Beckett rejected it. The reasoning that
Pennsylvania did not adopt the English common-law copyright
seemed to imply that the common-law copyright was recognized
in England." This misinterpretation of Donaldson v. Beckett
reinforced the confusion about the nature of copyright.
98 See Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 122,
99 This misreading of Donaldson v. Beckett was probable because of the
over reliance on the Burrow's Reports. In fact, the Burrow's Reports
did not contain the whole process and content of Donaldson v. Beckett.
In Burrow's Reports, Millar v. Taylor consisted of over one hundred
pages and Donaldson v. Beckett only ten pages. Donaldson v. Beckett was
just like an appendix of Millar v Taylor. It was easy to be misled on
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B. The Nature of American Copyright
Theoretically, Wheaton v. Peters had already mandated the
nature of American copyright as a statutory-grant right.
However, the common-law copyright did not stop its influence
on later judicial decisions, which created confusion about
the nature of copyright. The reason was partly because of the
misconception about the existence of the common-law
copyright. Since an author had the common-law right before
publication, this caused the assumption that an author just
transferred his or her common-law right to a statutory-grant
right after publication. Plus the misunderstanding about the
existence of the common-law copyright in England, the result
was the claim that common law was the theoretical basis of
statutory copyright. Copyright had a dual and contradictory
theoretical basis and thus the confusion about the nature of
copyright was enhanced.
In fact, the common-law copyright had never existed in the
Anglo-American copyright history. Copyright originated and
continuously functioned as a statutory-grant right. The issue
of an author's common-law right was always litigated under
the situation that there was a copyright statute. The
the point that the House of Lords agreed with the decision of Millar v.
Taylor and recognized the common-law copyright. A complete report of
Donaldson v. Beckett is in CoJbbett's Parliamentary History which
demonstrates that the lords rejected the common-law copyright. See
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 37-38. See also Abrams, supra note
83, at 1183-84.
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publication was always a requirement for obtaining copyright.
[Not until the 1976 Act, the publication requirement was
eliminated. ] Copyright was obtained because of publication,
but not creation. Creation of a work was a necessary but not
sufficient condition for obtaining copyright. The common-law
copyright had never existed except the five years between the
Millar case and the Donaldson case. The rejection of the
common-law copyright by Donaldson v. Beckett100 and Wheaton
v. Peters 101 made this right a stillborn concept. After the
decision of Wheaton, it was the name of the common-law
copyright itself which misled that there was another kind of
copyright existed other than the statutory copyright. The
common-law copyright, nonetheless, was just a name and played
no role after a work was published. 102
This controversy about the nature of copyright impeded the
development of the subordinate rules . The most deplorable
result may be the difficulty to distinguish the difference
between copyright and the work which copyright is subject to.
Following the natural-law theory, it is no need to have any
distinction between copyright and the work, since all the
interests upon the work belong to the author and (or) the
copyright owner even after publication. Any use of the
copyrighted work, except those conferred by the statute, may
100 97. 4 Burr. 2408; 98 Eng. Rep. 257; 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774); 17
Cobbett's Pari. Hist. 953 (1813).
101 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
102 See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 118-120.
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constitute infringement. However, if complying with the
statutory-grant theory, the copyright owner has only the
rights granted by the statute. Other rights are free for use
by society. A valid distinction between copyright and the
work plays an important role in the distinction between the
use of copyright and the use of the work.
The 1976 Copyright Act finally determines the nature of
copyright by abolishing the common-law copyright. Section 301
makes copyright exclusively a matter of federal law and
rejects the application of common law and statutes of any
State. 103 Copyright thus is governed by a single sovereign.
Before the 1976 Act, ownership of the work was governed by
the state law and ownership of copyright by the federal law.
The federal courts had no legal basis to separate copyright
and the work, since the rights conferred by ownership of the
work was a matter of state law. After the 1976 Act makes
copyright solely a matter of federal law, the work is also
governed by the federal government. Section 202 then makes a
distinction between ownership of a copyright and ownership of
any material object. 104
However, the 1976 Act does not have any provisions to deal
with the ownership of the work explicitly. Since an author
creates the work, the only logical candidate to own the work
is the author. Under the 1976 Act, an author obtains
copyright of the work at the moment when he or she has fixed
103 17 U.S.C. §301 (1994).
104 Id. §202.
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the ideas in a tangible medium of expression. 105 That is, an
author owns both copyright and the work upon creation.
Because copyright is distinct from the work, the assignment
of copyright does not mean the assignment of the work.
Moreover, §203 gives the author a termination right which is
inalienable and limited to the author or heirs. 106 Just like
a reversionary interest in real property, this termination
interest needs a proprietary basis for claiming the right.
The proprietary basis of copyright has to be the work. It
implies that the author owns the work because he or she has
the inalienable termination right. The ownership of the work
remains in the author.
The nature of copyright is a statutory-grant right.
Copyright owners can only have the rights granted by the
statute and other rights belong to the public. This
statutory-grant theory requires a valid distinction between
copyright and the work. The use of copyright and the use of
the work are totally two different things. The distinction
between copyright and the work is just the basis for
analyzing the users' rights. 107
105 id. §102(a).
106 Id. §203.
107 There is a great explanation about the nature of copyright in
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 109-22.
CHAPTER 5
THE ENDANGERED RIGHT OF ACCESS
The purpose and nature of copyright are both designed for
protecting the users' right of access in order to promote
learning. But the development of copyright in the twentieth
century tends to expand copyright owners' exclusive rights,
which unfortunately endangers the users' right of access.
In the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress expanded the copyright
owners ' exclusive rights by adding the right to copy in the
grant-of-rights section. 108 Later in the 1976 Act, copyright
owners were given the right to reproduce the copyrighted
works in copies or phonorecords
.
109 The assumption derived
from this expansion was that the copyright owners had a
complete and absolute right to copy a work, which inhibit
users ' right of access to copy the copyrighted work for
personal use.
The elimination of the publication requirement and the
codification of the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act further
endangers users' right of access. To accommodate copyright to
the new communications technology, the publication
requirement is eliminated because this kind of works are
108 17 U.S.C. §l(a) (1909 Act).
109 17 U.S.C. §106 (1994).
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performed rather than published. 110 The long-term safeguard
of the right of access vanished.
The codification of the fair use doctrine enables
copyright owners to claim that any use of the copyrighted
works should be governed under the fair use restrictions,
including personal use. 111 The result is a personal users'
tax.
Since the subordinate principles and rules shall be
decided according to the policies, the interpretation of
these three changes will be based on the purpose and nature
of copyright. This chapter will explain the right to copy and
the elimination of publication requirement. The personal use
and the effect of the codification of the fair use will be
discussed in the next chapter.
A. The Right to Copy
The verb "to copy" has two meanings. It means to duplicate an
original (for example, with a photocopying machine or a
videotape recorder) or to imitate an original by using it as
a model (for example, to translate, digest, or abridge a
copyrighted work). 112
This distinction can be clearly explained when we examine
copyright in the nineteenth century. Before the 1909 Act,
110 id. §102(a).
111 id. §107.
112 See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 146-47
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copyright owners had only the right to print, reprint,
publish, and vend the work. 113 Another author could not
duplicate the copyrighted work for sale, but could freely
imitate the work through the way of abridging, digesting, or
translating. Individual users had no interests in copying by
imitation the copyrighted work, but could duplicate it. Since
to buy a book was cheaper and more convenient than to
duplicate it, individual users' duplication was thus not an
issue. Even if someone spent a lot of time and energy to
duplicate a book by hand, it would not affect the market.
The new technology is the reason that makes the right to
copy an issue. The photocopying machine and the videotape
recorder give users a convenient and cheap method to copy the
copyrighted works. Copyright owners claim that their profit
is seriously harmed by individual users' copying. The issue
now is what is the scope of the copyright owners'
reproduction right?
The key point to the scope of the right to copy is whether
this right is a dependent or an independent right. 114 If it
is a dependent right exercised for vending the work, users
will also have the right to copy within a reasonable scope.
If it is an independent right with absolute and complete
strength, any users' copying of the copyrighted work may
constitute infringement.
113 1 Stat. 124 §1 (1790 Act) (1845); 4 Stat. 436 §1 (1831 Revision
Act) (1845).
114 See L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, supra note 2, at 260.
53
(1). In the 1909 Copyright Act
Section 1(a) of the 1909 Copyright Act gave copyright owners
the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, copy, and
vend the copyrighted work." 115 The right to copy was a new
right for the copyright owners. The purpose for Congress to
add this right was for protecting the art works on the
market
.
Before the 1909 Act, the proprietor of book, map, or chart
had the right to print, reprint, and publish the work. But
the right to publish could not provide enough protection for
the works of art, the Congress then gave the art works the
right to copy the work in order to provide reasonable chance
for the art works to obtain profit on the market. 116
115 17 U.S.C. §l(a) (1909 Act).
116 The House report on the bill that became the 1909 Act said that the
addition of the right to copy was just an adoption of old phraseology,
which did not change the phraseology of section 4 952 of the Revised
Statutes. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes was as follows:
"The author, inventor, designer or proprietor of any book,
map, chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving, cut,
print, or photograph or negative thereof, or of a painting,
drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of models or designs
intended to be perfected as works of the fine
arts, .. .shall .. .have the sole liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and
vending the same " 26 Stat. 1106, at 1107 (1891).
The meaning of section 4952 of the Revised Statutes was that one
could have the right to print, reprint, and publish a book, map, or
chart, to execute and finish models or designs, or to copy an
engraving, cut, print, photograph, painting, drawing, chromo, statue,
or statuary. The right to copy applied to works of art only.
Sections 4964 and 4965 of the Revised Statutes which distinguished
the conduct that infringed a book from that infringing upon other kinds
of works supported this interpretation. Section 4964 stated that to
print, publish, or import a book without the consent of the copyright
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However, the right to copy was granted in the grant-of-
rights section. Supposedly, it applied to all kind of works.
No matter the right to copy applied to all works or the art
works only, the purpose of this right was for protecting the
work on the market, just like the purpose of the right to
print, reprint, and publish was.
The purpose of the right to print, reprint, and publish
was for vending the works since the stationers' copyright.
During the era of the stationers' copyright, the printers had
the right to print and reprint, 117 and the booksellers had
the right to publish. The purpose of these three rights was
for vending the books on the market. The right of print,
reprint, or import in the Statute of Anne was still for
vending the works. The meaning of the right to print,
reprint, and publish from the 1790 Act to the 1909 Act kept
as the same. This is the market principle which manifests the
purpose of copyright as protecting the works for the market.
This principle continues to function as one of the major
principles of American copyright. 118
owner was an infringement. 2 6 Stat. 1106, at 1109; see also The Revised
Statutes of the United States, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 957-60, at 959
(1878). Section 4965 said that to engrave, etch, work, copy, print,
publish, or import copyrighted works other than a book without
permission from the copyright owner was an infringement. Ibid. It
implied that to copy a book was not an infringement of copyright. The
right to copy was a general right but applied only to the works of art.
117 The custom of the book trade during the stationers ' copyright was
to print the first version of the book at the amount of 1,200 copies or
less, so it might often reguire reprinting. This was why the printers
had not only the right of print, but also the right of reprint. See
Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 65.
118 Id. at 64-66,
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The scope of the right to copy could not be broader than
the scope of the right to print, reprint, and publish. So the
purpose of the right to copy was also for vending the works.
The exact meaning of the exclusive rights in the 1909 Act,
thus, was the right to print and vend, the right to reprint
and vend, the right to publish and vend, and the right to
copy and vend.
The unfortunate result of adding the right to copy in
section 1(a) as a general right was that it gave the
copyright owners an excuse to claim that their right to copy
was a complete and absolute right. Actually, when the 1909
Act was enacted, the photocopying machine had not invented
yet. There was no reason for the Congress to give copyright
owners the right to copy to prevent users ' copying by
photocopying machine at the prephotocopying era. The right to
copy in the 1909 Act was a dependent right for vending the
works. 119
(2). In the 1976 Copyright Act
Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act gives copyright
owners 120 five exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce the
119 About the explanation of the meaning of the right to copy in the
1909 Act, see Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, supra note 2, at 258-
60. See also Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 81-85.
120 The definition of the "copyright owner" in §101 of the 1976 Act is
with respect to "any one of the exclusive rights comprised in a
copyright, and refers to the owner of that particular right." 17 U.S.C.
§101 (1994).
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copyrighted work in copies; (2) to prepare derivative works;
(3) to distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the
public; (4) to perform it publicly; and (5) to display it
publicly. 121
Among these five rights, the adaptation right, public
distribution right, public performance right, and public
display right are granted for marketing the work. The issue
is whether the reproduction right is granted for marketing
the work or for implementing the other four rights
.
The right to reproduce in the 1976 Act is a dependent
right for implementing the other four rights. To prepare
derivative works, the copyright owner must copy the original
work by using it as a model, that is, by imitating it. For
121 Id. §106. In the 1976 Copyright Act, there is no manifest
definition about the "exclusive rights," but it has the definitions
about other key terminology of section 106 in section 101.
A "derivative work" is "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization , motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
derivative work."
To "perform" a work means "to recite, render, play, dance, or act
it,... in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible.
"
To "display" a work means "to show a copy of it,... in the case of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show individual images
nonsequentially .
"
To perform or display a work "publicly" means "(1) to perform or
display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or
process[], whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
places and at the same time or at different times."
Id. §101.
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distributing a work to the public, it is necessary to
reproduce the original work in copies by duplication. For the
same reason, to exercise the public performance right or the
public display right, the copyright owner must duplicate the
original work in copies or phonorecords . For example, it is
necessary to duplicate a motion picture in copies for
repeated and wide public performance, or to duplicate
individual images of the motion picture in copies for public
display. The right to reproduce functions to implement the
right of adaptation, public distribution, public performance,
and public display.
The argument that the reproduction right is an independent
right does not possess a sound theoretical ground when we
explain it in light of the whole grant-of-rights section. In
§106, the distribution right, the performance right, and the
display right are protected only when the rights are
exercised publicly. If an user distributes, performs, or
displays a copyrighted work privately, it is not an
infringement of copyright. If the reproduction right is an
independent right with absolute power, no matter what the
reason an user reproduces the copyrighted work, it will
constitute an infringement. The copyright owners' exclusive
rights would be expanded unreasonably to the extent that an
user's reproduction for private distribution, performance, or
display constitutes an infringement. The statutory
limitations imposed on the exclusive rights would be negated
under this kind of wrong interpretation of the right to copy.
58
The reproduction right is and should be a dependent right
when §106 is interpreted as an integrated whole. 122
There are two kinds of rights in §106. The adaptation
right, public distribution right, public performance right,
and public display right are subject rights which can be
independently exercised for implementing the function of
copyright marketing the work for profit. The reproduction
right is a predicate right which is dependent in nature for
implementing the function of the subject rights.
This kind of interpretation reflects the purpose of
copyright for promoting learning and the nature of copyright
as a statutory-grant right. Since the public interests is
superior to the copyright owners' private interests, 123 the
scope of exclusive right can not be broader than the extent
that the copyright owners have unreasonable monopoly to
control the market. The method to prevent copyright owners'
monopoly is to keep the works provided on the market with a
reasonable price. If the right to copy is an independent
right, even though the work is not available with a
reasonable price, personal users can not duplicate it. Thus,
the copyright owners ' monopoly would be enhanced and the
purpose of copyright would be inhibited.
The nature of copyright is that copyright is a statutory-
grant right. Copyright owners can only have the exclusive
122 See Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, supra note 2, at 260-61
123 See supra text accompanying notes 43-82.
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rights granted by the statute. 124 If the right to copy is an
independent right with exclusive and absolute power, it would
override the public limitation that §106 imposed on the
distribution right, performance right, and display right. The
right to copy should be a dependent right.
A reasonable conclusion as to the scope of the right to
copy is that this right is a dependent right for implementing
the subject rights. If an user's copying is for private
reasons without exercising any subject rights, it does not
constitute an infringement. That is, personal users have the
right to reproduce the copyrighted works, since it does not
use copyright but only use the work.
B. The Elimination of the Publication Requirement
According to §102 (a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright
comes into existence while the work is "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 125 Authors obtain copyright right
after the work is created and fixed. The publication
requirement as a quid pro quo for copyright protection is
eliminated.
This change is for protecting copyright of the new
communications technology, especially for television
124 See supra text accompanying notes 83-107.
125 17 U.S.C. §102(a). The content of §102(a) is as follows: "Copyright
protection subsists, .. .in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device...."
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broadcast. The marketing method of the communications
technology is to transmit the work through public airwaves.
The transmission is a kind of performance, which is different
from the traditional publication. Publication assures users'
access to the works, however, performance threats the right
of access.
Print materials require publication in order to obtain
profit even though publication is not a requirement for
copyright protection. Publication makes print materials at
least be available on the library shelves. It ensures not
only the contemporary accessibility to the copyrighted works
but also the future availability for the public domain. 126
However, the performance of a work does not guarantee the
subsequent availability of the works. After a work is
performed, it may not be published on the market, may not be
available on the library shelf, and may be erased after the
performance. Copyright owners obtain copyright protection and
a profit through the initial performance, and still control
the further accessibility to the works. 127
This kind of protection for the electronic copyright is
detrimental to the constitutional purpose as the promotion of
learning. Learning requires access to the works. Distribution
of the works ensures the access. The best way to promote
learning is to encourage the distribution but not only
126 See Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 100.
127 Ibid.
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encourage the creation of works. 128 The purpose of the
creation requirement is to prevent the works in the public
domain been under copyright monopoly repeatedly. The
excessive protection which gives the copyright owners of the
electronic media the right to control the access to the
copyrighted works inhibit learning.
Television programs not only provide entertainment but
also shape public opinion. Its role on modern life is
significant. To broadcast in a rigid period of time without
future availability derogates the public interests. An
explicit rule to protect public's right of access is
necessary. The Supreme Court protects individual users' right
to copy the motion pictures broadcast on television by
videotape recorders for private use in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (the Betamax case). 129 A
further protection of the right of access by imposing the
duty on copyright owners to provide subsequent availability
of the works after performance is also vitally important for
the promotion of learning. Copyright is a statutory-grant
128 Id. at 49-50; see also Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, supra note 62, at 6-8.
129 480 F. Supp. 429 (CD. Cal . 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). The Supreme Court held that
"manufacturers of home videotape recorders demonstrated a significant
likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who licensed
their works for broadcast on free television would not object to having
their broadcasts time shifted by private viewers and owners of
copyrights on television programs failed to demonstrate that time
shifting would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to the potential
market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works and therefore home
videotape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses; thus,
manufacturers ' sale of such equipment to general public did not
constitute contributory infringement of respondents' copyrights." 104
S. Ct. 774, at 774.
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right for promoting the public interests, but rather a
proprietary right for protecting copyright owners ' private
interests.
CHAPTER 6
THE PERSONAL USE PRINCIPLE
There is no specific statutory rules about the personal
users' rights in the 1976 Act. The lack of statutory rules
for personal use is probably because personal use had not
become an issue until the emergence of new technologies. The
source of personal users ' rights is the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution. 130 The purpose of copyright in the
Copyright Clause is to promote learning. The assumption
follows that more use of the work makes greater promotion of
learning. Thus, protection of citizen's right to use the work
is necessary for attaining the constitutional purpose. The
individual users' rights are protected by the Constitution.
The controversy about the personal users ' rights is the
individual ' s right to copy the copyrighted works for private
reasons. The design of the 1976 Act makes this controversy
more complex. Section 106 is the rule about the copyright
owners' exclusive rights. 131 Following §106, sections 107
through 120 are limitations on exclusive rights. 132 This kind
of design results in the assumption that the copyright
130 U.S. CONST, art. I, §8, cl.8.
131 17 U.S.C. §106 (1994) .
132 Id. §§107-120.
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owners' exclusive rights have absolute strength subject to
limitations only. Under this proposition, personal use is one
of the exception of the copyright owners' exclusive rights,
rather than a right from the Constitution. 133
According to our analysis of the nature of copyright as a
statutory-grant right, copyright owners can have the right
granted by the statute only. 134 They can just have the rights
granted in section 106. Their right to reproduce is a
dependent right. 135 Personal users have the right to copy the
copyrighted works
.
The reason that really blurs the personal users ' rights in
the 1976 Act is the codification of the fair use doctrine.
Section 107 says that the fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright. There are four non-
exclusive criteria in this section to decide an use is fair
or foul. 136 Since there is no independent rules about
personal users' rights, the assumption is that every use
should apply to those criteria to determine its legitimacy,
including personal use.
In fact, personal use is different from fair use. There
are two different kind of users' rights: one is the fair use
of a copyright by an author, and another is the personal use
of a work by an individual. Personal use does not need to be
133 See Patterson & LlNDBERG, supra note 1, at 193-94.
134 see SUpra text accompanying notes 83-107.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 112-124.
136 17 U.S.C. §107 (1994).
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governed by the fair use criteria. Its scope of use should be
broader than the scope of fair use. 137
A. Fair Use
Fair use originated as a fair-competitive-use doctrine by
Folsom v. Marsh. 138 The codification of it in the 1976
Copyright Act does not change its nature as a fair
competitive use. Fair use is designed for protecting
competitive users
'
right to use copyright of the copyrighted
works
.
(1). The Origin of Fair Use
The fair use doctrine was created by Justice Story in the
nineteenth century to supersede the fair abridgment doctrine.
Under the 1790 Copyright Act, a second author had the right
to freely abridge another author's work. The second author's
work was viewed as a new work without infringing the first
author's copyright. 139
137 See patterson & LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 193.
138 9 Fed# CaSi 3 4 2 ( No . 4901)(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
139 Tne exclusive rights granted in the 1790 Copyright Act were the
"sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and
vending..." 1 Stat. 124-26 (1845). Because copyright is a statutory-
grant right, the copyright owner only had the right to print, reprint,
publish and vend the work. A second author's condensation of the
materials of the original work did not constitute a piracy of
copyright, since it did not employ the right of printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending.
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In 1841, Folsom v. Marsh was submitted to the Circuit
Court of Massachusetts in front of Justice Story. 140 The
relevant issue here was whether the defendant's abridgment of
the plaintiff's work was just. In this case, the defendant
derived 353 of the 866 pages from the plaintiff's twelve-
volume biography of George Washington in writing his own two-
volume biography of the first president. 141 Justice Story
overruled defendant
' s defense of fair abridgment and imposed
three criteria to judge whether a use of the copyrighted work
is fair or not:
The question, then, is, whether this is a justifiable
use of the original materials ,... In short, we must
often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits,
or supersede the objects, of the original work. 142
140 When Folsom v. Marsh was submitted to the Circuit Court, the
involved Copyright Act was the Revision Act of 1831. 4 Stat. 436
(1845). Copyright owners' exclusive rights of the Revision Act of 1831
were the same as those rights in the 1790 Act. Id. §1.
141 The points made by the defendants were as follows:
"I. The papers of George Washington are no subjects of copyright....
II. Mr. Sparks (the plaintiff) is not the owner of these papers,
but they belong to the United States, and may be published by any one.
III. An author has a right to quote, select, extract or abridge
from another, in the composition of a work essentially new." 9 Fed.
Cas. at 344.
142 9 Fed. Cas. at 34 8.
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The result of this case is the creation of the fair use
doctrine which enhanced copyright owners' monopoly. The
litigants in Folsom v. Marsh were both authors, which showed
the fact that fair use was created for balancing competitive
authors' rights. The fair use doctrine was promulgated to
give a second author the right to use another author's
copyright. It was a fair-competitive-use doctrine.
(2). The Codification of the Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine served as a judicial rule to balance
the competitive authors' rights until the 1976 Copyright Act.
The dramatic change of the copyright concepts in the 1976 Act
creates a necessity for the codification of fair use. Both
the exemption of the common-law copyright which manifests
that the statute is the only source of copyright and the
protection of the electronic copyright which expands
copyright owners ' monopoly results in the codification of the
fair use doctrine to prevent copyright become an obstacle for
learning.
Section 107 of the 1976 Act articulates the fair use
doctrine, which reads as follows:
Section 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
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other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work. 143
The defect of §107 is that it fails to distinguish copyright
and the work. The "use of a copyrighted work" seems to imply
that the use of a work is the same as the use of copyright.
It further implies that the work is the copyright owners'
property. Under this premise, there seems to possess no basis
to distinguish the competitors ' use of copyright and the
consumers' use of the work.
Actually, the preamble of §107 includes examples of
personal use as well as fair use. Among the six examples
143 17 U.S.C. §107. About a detailed explanation of the four criteria
in §107, see generally Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 200-07.
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which is not an infringement of copyright, scholarship and
research is within the scope of personal use. However, to
articulate personal use together with fair use provides
copyright owners an excuse to claim that personal use must be
applied to the fair use criteria in §107.
The codification of fair use in §107 of the 1976 Act
almost negates its nature as a fair competitive use. Under
the Copyright Clause, Congress is empowered to grant authors
the exclusive right to publish, that is, Congress can
legislate rules to protect the works against competitors'
unfair use only. It is unconstitutional to give copyright
owners the right to control consumers ' use of the copyrighted
works. The codification of fair use does not change its
nature as a fair-competitive-use doctrine. Fair use is for
protecting competitors' right of use of the copyright. 144
B. Personal Use
Personal use is the use of the copyrighted works for one's
own private reasons, which includes the copying of the works.
The threat to the personal users' rights in the 1976 Act is
the codification of the fair use doctrine. Copyright owners,
thus, claim that personal use should be governed by the fair
use of §107. The issue is whether personal use should apply
to the fair use restraints.
144 See Patterson & LiNDBERG, supra note 1, at 102-06.
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The first thing we need to recall here is that fair use
was created and still functions to protect the use of the
copyright. The use of copyright entails the use of the work,
but the use of the work does not necessarily entail the use
of copyright. Just like the transfer of ownership of the work
does not of itself convey the copyright of that work, and
vice versa. 145 This justifies the wording of §107 that the
"fair use of a copyrighted work" is not an infringement.
Since a fair use of the copyright also entails the use of the
work, the "copyrighted work" in §107 means the "fair use of
copyright of the copyrighted work." Congress can only have
the power to limit the use of copyright, but is not empowered
to limit the use of the work. Thus, section 107 governs just
the use of copyright.
The use of the copyrighted works by individual users
employs the work only and does not employ the copyright. Just
like we reveal previously, the reproduction right of the
copyright owners is a dependent right and individual users
have the right to copy the copyrighted works. 146 The
duplication of the copyrighted works by personal users does
not further employ copyright owners' adaptation right, public
distribution right, public performance right, or public
display right. That is, individual users does not employ the
copyright of the copyrighted works. Only when a use employs
the copyright is it necessary to judge whether this use is
145 17 u.s.c. §202.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 112-124.
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fair or not. The constitutional purpose of copyright is to
protect the copyright owners
' rights against competitors , but
not to inhibit individual's use for learning. Basically, all
the personal use is intrinsically fair. Personal use is the
use of the work which does not need to apply to the fair use
restraints. 147
In the 1976 Act, there are some rules which utilize the
personal use. Section 107 itself protects the use of the
copyrighted works for scholarship and research. 148 Further in
subsection (d) and (e) of section 108, a library or archives
has the right to reproduce a copy of the copyrighted work
under the patron's request. 149 Since library or archives can
reproduce the copyrighted works as an agent, a further
inference of §108 is that the patron himself or herself has
the same right to reproduce a copy of the copyrighted works
for his or her own file.
147 See Patterson & LlNDBERG, supra note 1, at 197-200.
148 17 U.S.C. §107.
149 Id. §108. Section 108 (d) provides that a library or archives,
under the request of the user, can reproduce a copy of "no more than
one article or other contribution to a copyrighted collection or
periodical issue, or to a copy or phonorecord of a small part of any
other copyrighted work,..." Section 108 (e) permits a library or
archives to reproduce for the user the entire work, or a substantial
part of it if "the copyrighted work cannot be obtained at a fair
price, ..."
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C. Personal Use Criteria
Since personal use is not inside the boundary of fair use,
its copying of the copyrighted works is not subject to
lengthy restrictions. Personal users can make a single copy
of the copyrighted works for their own private files, but
this copy can not serve as a functional substitute to avoid
the purchase of the work which is now available on the market
with a reasonable price. 150
Another point is that personal users ' right to copy is
less applicable to the works which is created for functional
purpose rather than for dissemination of knowledge. The
computer program and the architectural plan are two examples
.
The purpose of the copying of this kind of work is almost
undoubtedly for making the functional use of it. The value of
the original work would be diminished by this kind of use.
Under the constitutional scheme, the purpose to protect
personal users' rights is to promote learning, but not to
avoid the purchase of the works. If the use of the
copyrighted work falls outside the scope of personal use, it
should resort to fair use to decide whether this use is fair
or not. 151
An issue about the computer program in recent years is
that the copyright owners tend to make their own self-
regulations on restricting the use of the works by users.
150 See Patterson & Lindberg, supra note 1, at 194.
151 See id. at 194-95.
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They distribute computer programs with shrink-wrapped
licenses, which restrict users' right to use the works even
to the extent that violate the statutory rules. The main
point of their proclamation is to prohibit users' right to
copy the computer programs. Because the copying of the
computer programs, in most of the cases, will require the
copying of the entire works, the copyright owners thus ask
for special protection. This protection is to deny users'
right to copy, which is protected by section 107 of the 1976
Act. While the users can not unreasonably harm the copyright
owners' right by copying the entire work, the copyright
owners also have no basis to negate users' right to copy if
the work is not available on the market with a fair price.
The point to balance these two conflict rights is to have a
reasonable price of the works. 152
Personal use is the use of the work for private reasons.
It does not need to apply to the fair use restraints. The
copying by personal users is not subject to length
restrictions, but it can not be made for public distribution
or as a functional substitute for the copyrighted work which
is currently available on the market with a reasonable price.
However, the copyright owners tend to treat personal use
as one of the fair use branches. The most dangerous
proposition of the copyright owners is to impose a users' tax
on individual's copying of the works. This inevitably
endangers personal users' right of access to the copyrighted
152 Id. at 218-22.
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works which is protected by the Constitution for the
promotion of learning.
D. Personal Users' Tax
Personal users
' tax is a fee charged at every time when the
copyrighted work is copied by individual users . The earliest
example of the users ' tax is the tax imposed on the public
performance of musical compositions charged by the American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers. The users' tax
in this instance can be justified, since it is charged for
public performance which is a kind of competitive use. 153
However, the charge of the personal users' tax is without
legal sanction.
According to our analysis of the purpose and policies of
copyright, the personal users' tax obstacles users' right of
access if personal users have to pay tax at every time they
use the copyrighted works. It inhibits learning. Copyright
owners not only can profit from the primary market by selling
works, but also can obtain extra benefit from the secondary
market by imposing license fees on individual users. 154 The
statutory right for the copyright owners to control the use
of copyright extends unreasonably to control the use of the
153 id. at 129.
154 About copyright owners ' rights on the primary market and the
secondary market, see generally id. at 186-90.
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work. The nature of copyright as a statutory-grant right is
also nullified by the imposition of the personal users' tax.
The 197 6 Copyright Act explicitly protects individual
users' right to copy the copyrighted works. In section 107,
scholars and researchers are acknowledged to have the right
to reproduce the copyrighted works in copies or phonorecords
within the fair scope. 155 The further inference from §107 is
that if the fair users have the right to copy the copyrighted
works, the personal users who just use the work ought to have
the same right. Section 108 (d) and (e) permit librarians'
copying of the copyrighted works for personal users. 156 The
personal users
'
tax is both unconstitutional and without
statutory sanction.
Copyright owners claim that individual users will make
copy of the copyrighted works to substitute the purchase of
them. If the reality is really like so, the reason is almost
because of the monopolistic price of the copyrighted works.
Copying a work requires expense of time, money, and energy,
and means the loss of quality. The best way is to make the
works more attractive on both the price and quality.
155 17 U.S.C. §107.
156 Id. §108 (d) & (e). The Supreme Court's decision in Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States further confirms the users' right to
reproduce the copyrighted works for research. 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The
issue in this case was whether the photocopying of copyrighted articles
in medical journals by government medical research institute and its
library on an individual request constituted as an fair use. The Court
of Claims held that this kind of copying which was limited to a single
copy of a single article and to articles of less than 50 pages was a
fair use. 487 F.2d. 1345 (1973). The Supreme Court affirmed it in an
equally divided decision.
76
Copyright is for protecting the works on the market, but not
to guarantee profit. A reasonable price of the work provided
by the copyright owners and a reasonable right of the users
to use the works are the way to balance the two conflict
interests the copyright owners' interest for profit and the
users' interest for learning. 157
157 About the discussion of the personal users' tax, see Patterson &
LINDBERG, supra note 1, at 157-59; see also Patterson, Understanding
Fair Use, at 262,263.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Personal use is just a small part of copyright. The purpose
of it, like any other copyright principles and rules, is for
promoting the purpose of learning. Because personal use had
not become an issue until the emergence of new technologies,
it has not gained much attentions
.
The focal point of the personal users ' right is the right
of access. The new technologies give personal users the
convenience to use and copy the copyrighted works. Just
because the ease to copy, copyright owners thus ask for
excessive rights which endanger users' right of access. The
scattered power of individual users is, of course, not
powerful enough to fight with the organized power of
entrepreneurs
.
Both Congress and the courts must contribute to protect
the personal users' rights. Congress is better to legislate
statutory rules to protect personal users' rights. The
courts, when decide specific copyright issues, should
consider copyright as an integrated whole and make their
decisions to reflect copyright policies and principles. The
continuous enhancement of the copyright owners' exclusive
rights is detrimental to the users ' rights
.
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There are three major interests in copyright: the authors'
moral rights, 158 the publishers' marketing rights, 159 and the
users' learning rights. 160 The tendency of American copyright
to emphasize the economic aspect results in the overdeveloped
publishers ' rights and the underdeveloped authors ' rights and
users' rights. Copyright is a comprise between the public
interests and the private interests. All the three rights
must accommodate to each other to accomplish the purpose of
copyright as the promotion of learning.
The future path of personal users ' rights should not only
accommodate to the publishers' rights, but also have the
legal responsibility to respect the authors' moral rights.
Only when these three rights are balanced in a proper way can
learning be promoted. The value of learning is just the
reason why copyright is so important in our life. 161
158 About details of the authors' moral rights, see generally PATTERSON &
Lindberg, supra note 1, at 163-76.
159 About the publishers' rights, see generally id. at 17 7-90.
160 About the discussion of the users' rights, see generally id. at
191-222.
161 See id. at 225-41; see also Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, at
266.
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